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[erim. No. 5763. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.~ 
THE PEOPLE, AppelJant, v. JAMES W. SANDERS, 
Respondent. 
[la,lb] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where officers 
went to defendant's phonograph record shop in search of an-
other man they had arrested the day before at such shop 
for bookmaking, entered the front door which was open to the 
public, looked through a hole cut in the door to a second room 
which was not open to the public, and saw defendant, who was 
known to them personally as a bookmaker, standing behind a 
desk with a pencil in his hand and some pads of paper in 
front of him on which there was writing, they were not 
justified from what they saw in entering the second room 
without a search warrant to make an arrest and take from 
defendant's person and premises keys, betting markers, owe 
sheets and scratch sheets, since there was no basis for con-
cluding that the pads, which could be found in any office, 
were being used for bookmaking rather than for his business, 
and no basis for concluding, in the absence of a telephone in 
such room, that the writing on the pads was in response to 
calls that might have been made to place or record bets. 
[2a,2b] Arrest-Without Warrant.-The fact that defendant had 
been a bookmaker in the past or bore. that reputation and the 
fact that another bookmaker had been on his premises the day 
before would not of themselves constitute reasonable cause 
to believe that defendant's conduct, which was consistent with 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 22 
c:t seq. 
MrX. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1j [2) 
Arrest, § 5. 
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the lawful conduct of his business, constituted occupancy of 
the premises for the purpose of bookmaking, and hence there 
was no justification for his arrest without a warrant. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting a motion to set aside an information. 
Allen T. Lynch, Judge. Affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Lewis Watnick, Deputy 
District Attorneys, for Appellant. 
G. Vernon Brumbaugh for Respondent. 
A.. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as amici curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged 
with keeping and occupying a business building for the 
purpose of horse-race bookmaking in violation of Penal Code, 
section 337a, subdivision 2. Defendant was arrested at his 
place of business, and evidence taken by the officers from 
defendant's person and the premises was introduced at the 
preliminary hearing. It consisted of keys to the premises 
that were in defendant's possession, betting markers,owe 
sheets, and scratch sheets. One of the officers testified that 
at the time of the arrest he answered the telephone, and a 
female voice said, ., This is Maude. Give me your answer 
on Devil's Sound in the 2d race at Hialeah." Five or six 
other callers asked for Jimmy, and when the officer told them 
that Jimmy had stepped out, they hung up. The officers 
were not questioned at the preliminary hearing with respect 
to facts bearing on the legality of their search or the lawful-
ness of the arrest. When, however, defendant moved to set 
the information aside on the ground that the evidence was 
illegally obtained, the parties stipulated to the following 
additional facts: The officers went to defendant's place of 
business, a phonograph record shop, in the morning in search 
of another man they had arrested the day before at the record 
shop for bookmaking. They entered the front door of the 
shop, 'Which was open to the public and used to display 
records. No one was in the front room, and the officers went 
to a door that separated it from. a second room behind, 
which was not open to the pUblic. There was a large hole 
) 
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cut in this door, and the officers looked through the hole 
and saw defendant, who was known to them personally as a 
bookmaker, in the second room standing with a pencil in his 
hand. On a table in front of him. they observed some pads 
of paper that appeared to be "the kind and character of pads 
of paper used in that area where the record shop was located 
by bookmakers who mal;:e book on horse races," and they 
saw writing on the pads. They then entered the second 
room without permission by opening the door for the purpose 
of arresting defendant for bookmaking. They arrested de· 
fendant and then secured the evidence introduced at the 
preliminary hearing by searching the premises. The tele-
phone that the officer answered was located in a third or back 
room, "entry being made into that room from the center or 
second room through an opening in a partition which does 
not have a door. " Neither of the officers had a search war-
rant or a warrant for defendant's arrest. 
The trial court held admissible the evidence of what the 
officers could see by looking through the hole in the door be-
tween the room open to the public and the second room that 
was not. It concluded, however, that what the officers could 
see from the door was not sufficient to justify their entry 
without a search warrant to make an arrest, and pointed out 
that the presence of pads with writing on them, even of the 
type ordinarily used by bookmakers in the vicinity, was 
consistent with the legitimate business of a record shop being 
conducted on the premises. Accordingly, it held that the 
evidence obtained after the officers entered the second room 
without a warrant or permission was incompetent, and since 
the remaining evidence was insufficient, it granted defend-
ant's motion to set the information aside. The People appeal.· 
The attorney general contends that when the officers looked 
through the door into the second room, they had reasopable 
cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony and 
that he was committing the offense of occupying premises 
for the purposes of bookmaking in their presence, and that 
therefore the arrest and search were lawful. (See Pen. Code. 
§ 836, subds. (1), (3); PeopZe v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761-762 
[290 P.2d 855].) We cannot agree with this contention. 
[la] When the officers looked through the door they saw 
nothing that was incriminating. They merely saw defendant 
standing behind a desk with a pencil in his hand and two 
pads of paper in front of bim. There was writing on the 
pads. Defendant was operating a record store open to the 
.) 
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public, and just as in the case of any shopkeeper, business-
man, or professional man, he might reasonably be expected to 
have pencils and pads of paper available for making notes 
and memoranda for use in the legitimate conduct of hisbusi-
ness. Moreover, the fact that the pads of paper were of the 
kind used by bookmakers in the area is of no significance. 
They were ordinary small pads of paper of the sort that may 
be purchased in any stationery store and that are undoubtedly 
used by all sorts of persons for all sorts of purposes. Similar 
pads may be found in almost every office, and certainly, the 
fact that bookmakers also use them cannot constitute reason-
able cause to believe that everyone using them is engaged in 
bookmaking. 
[2a] The attorney general contends, however, that when 
what the officers saw is viewed in the light of the facf that 
another person had been arrested at the record shop for book-
making the day before and the fact that defendant was known 
personally to them as a bookmaker, reasonable cause for the 
arrest appears. It is true that the stipulated fact that de-
fendant was known personally to the officers as a bookmaker 
might be interpreted as of itself justifying an arrest. Thus 
the stipUlation is consistent with the conclusion that before 
the officers saw defendant in the record shop they knew he 
had committed felonies for which he was subject to prosecu-
tion, and that therefore they were justified in arresting him 
for such past offenses whenever he was found. Defendant, 
however, was not arrested for or charged with. any offenses 
other than the one discovered at the time of his arrest, and 
neither in the trial court nor on appeal has it been contended 
that the arrest may be justified as one for some past offense. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the stipUlated fact that de-
fendant was a known bookmaker does not mean that he was 
currently subject to arrest for past bookmaking, but only 
that he had that reputation or was known to the officers as 
a person who had been convicted of bookmaking. [lb] As 
pointed out above, however, before the arrest and sear~h de-
fendant's activities appeared to be perfectly consistent with 
the lawful conduct of his record business. Defendant was 
merely present in his office with a pencil in his hand and 
pads of paper on the table in front of him, and there was no 
basis for concln<1ing that he was using- these items for book-
making rather than for his business that was then open to 
the pubHc. Moreover, since there was no telephone in the 
room where defendant was, or any indication that he had 
) 
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just completed a telephone call, or that any other person was 
present, there was absolutely no basis from appearances for 
concluding that the writing on the pads was in response to a 
call or calls that might have been made to place bets or to 
record bets placed by persons visiting the shop. 
[2b] The attorney general contends, however, that the 
officers could reasonably conclude that defendant's apparently 
innocent activities were bookmaking on the ground that an-
~ther person had been arrested foroookmaking at the record 
shop the day before. If it had been stipulated that the other 
person had been caught in :"he act of bookmaking on the 
premises, or that at the time of his arrest, evidence had been 
obtained that the premises were being used for bookmaking 
purposes, it might reasonably be contended that when a 
known bookmaker was found on the premises the next day, 
there was reasonable cause to believe that he also was oc-
cupying them for the purposes of bookmaking. The prosecu-
tion made no such showing, however, and the fact that de-
fendant had been a bookmaker in the past or bore that 
reputation and the fact that another bookmaker had been on 
the premises the day before, would not of themselves con-
stitute reasonable cause to believe that defendant's conduct, 
which was perfectly consistent with the lawful conduct of his 
business, in fact constituted occupancy of the premises for 
the purpose of bookmaking. (PearsO'n v. United States, 150 
F.2d 219, 221; Brown v. United States, 4 F.2d 246, 247; 
Baumboy v. United States, 24 F.2d 512, 513; People v. Ford, 
356 Ill. 572, 576 [191 N.E. 315]; see Brinegar v. Unit~d 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-177 [69 9. Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879] ; 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592-594 [68 S.Ot. 222, 
92 L.Ed. 210]; Hernandez v. United States, 17 F.2d 373.) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing clearly 
showed that defendant had committed, and was committing, 
a felony at the time of his arrest. The offense with which he 
was charged is in the nature of a continuing off~nse, as it 
covers any person who "keeps or occupies, for any perioc of 
time whatsoever, any ••. place ... with a book or boon, 
paper or papers . •. or paraphernalia, for the purpose of 
